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Summing up, both Huber and Kaegi try to prove too much,
at least insofar as their own bailiwick, the Swiss Confederation,
is concerned. The tendencies which they describe and decry so
vividly are less present under the conditions of Swiss society
than under many other contemporary governments. Yet, foresight is better than hindsight. And we have all reason to be
grateful to all those who familiarize us with their present
thoughts and concerns on that elusive jewel, the Rechtsstaat.
Otto Kirchheimer*
THE DOCTRINE OF UNJUSTIFIED ENRICHMENT IN THE LAW OF THE
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC [McGill Legal Studies No. 2], by George
S. Challies. Wilson and Lafleur, Limited, Montreal, 2d ed.
1952, pp. xii, 216.
This second edition brings up to date and in certain chapters
considerably amplifies the original edition of 1940. Ordinarily a
second edition merits a book note, but not a review, much less
one appearing almost two years after its publication. This book,
however, is the only detailed monograph in the English language
on the development and substance of the action for unjustified
enrichment in French and Quebec law;1 as such it can be of
tremendous influence to the good in Louisiana, where the basic
law is so similar, but where this particular subject is all but
unknown.
The principle of unjustified enrichment, that no one should
be enriched at the expense of another without justification, is the
foundation for much that is in any system of law, for it is a
corollary of the virtue of justice. Precisely because it is a basic
principle, it is applicable to phenomena far too numerous and
too varied to permit its abstract statement to serve as a rule of
law for all of them, and its articulation for the most part necessarily is in terms of specific rules of law for particular situations.
Thus Justice Challies can list sixty-four articles of the Quebec
Civil Code which he considers founded on the principle, though
* Dr. iur., Washington, D. C.
1. John P. Dawson's "Unjust Enrichment-A Comparative Analysis"
(Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1951), is a splendid book on the level of
comparative legal science, designed to provoke thought on the problem in
Anglo-American law. It contains an account of the action for unjust enrichment in France sufficient for the author's purpose, but it is not a treatise on
the subject, as is Justice Challies' book.
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the principle itself is not stated expressly in that code. For the
same reason, the Restatement of Restitution states the principle
and carefully notes that although it is the basis of the rules in
the remainder of that work it itself is not to be regarded as a
rule of law.
In a system of customary or common law the articulation
of the principle necessarily must be in terms of specific rules of
law applicable to particular situations, unless it be in the scientific literature or a restatement or compilation, for customary or
unwritten law cannot exist in the abstract. Conversely, this very
character of customary or common law compels the admission of
principles, unless the customs are to be regarded as whimsical
and arbitrary, and it is the rearticulation of these principles in
terms of specific norms for particular situations that is the life of
such a system. Thus it is that in customary or common law
principles are always part of the law, not in the form of rules of
law, but as principles proper which may be rearticulated to meet
new situations.
In France, however, with the adoption of the Code Civil, the
predominant theory equated law with legislation. Thus in theory
at least a principle could not be recognized as part of the law
unless enacted as such. The Code Civil did not contain a statement of the principle of unjustified enrichment, only specifications of it. Of course these specifications were not co-extensive
with the instances in which the principle would have to serve
as the basis of the norm of decision. In some of these cases the
analogical application of particular specifications sufficed, but not
always, for often none of the available specifications were truly
suitable to the facts at hand. Thus French jurisprudence fell to
misconstruing or twisting the rules of well-defined institutions
like negotiorum gestio and restitution for payments made without obligation, all in an effort to achieve a specification of the
principle which would suit the particular facts. By 1892, however,
legal positivism had lost most of its force in France and no longer
was it necessary to clothe the parent in its children's legislative
dress. The Cour de Cassation announced it would recognize an
action founded directly on the principle of unjustified enrichment. Since that time French jurisprudence has closely defined
the action and limited its application to situations involving unjustified enrichment for which the legislation has not provided a
specific norm. In other words, through judicial action France has
come to accept the principle of unjustified enrichment as a rule of
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law of subsidiary character to be used only where specific legislation based on the principle is not applicable.
The Quebec Civil Code was modeled very largely on that of
France, but unlike France, Quebec did not make its legislation
the sole statement of the law. The then existing customary law
was deemed to remain in effect except as modified by the Civil
Code. Hence Justice Challies notes well that the principle of
unjustified enrichment is still a part of the law of Quebec, for it
has never been repealed, and therefore that there is no need to
resort to the French theories to substantiate its employment as
the basis of judicial specifications of custom for instances not
covered in the existing legislation. Nevertheless, Justice Challies
recognizes that the basic law of France and that of Quebec are
substantially the same and that French doctrine and jurisprudence can be and are looked to for guidance in Quebec. Thus he
does not hesitate to discuss the Quebec jurisprudence on unjustified enrichment in the light of the French experience, and
his book is as much a source of information on the French law
on this subject as it is on that of Quebec.
Whether or not Louisiana law is limited to its legislation, as
in France, or includes its prior unrepealed law, and therefore
the principle of unjustified enrichment, as in Quebec, is a question
which is of no importance here; for Article 21 of the Civil Code
directs the judge to decide according to natural law and reason
when the legislation is silent or deficient, and certainly the
principle of unjustified enrichment may be regarded as part of
natural law and reason. But the Louisiana jurisprudence has not
much used the principle as a rule of law. Sometimes it has
decided unjustified enrichment cases by the application of norms
derived from Anglo-American legal institutions, for example,
constructive trust and quantum meruit, much to the disruption
of the scientific plan of our law, which in its civil part at least is
very similar to the legislations of France and Quebec. By
observing what these jurisdictions have done in the field of unjustified enrichment we might have avoided this and instead
have developed a jurisprudence and doctrine consistent with the
rest of our legislation. The articles of the French, Quebec, and
Louisiana Civil Codes specifying the application of the principle
for particular cases being largely the same, as evidenced by a
concordance table prepared by Justice Challies (p. 187), the
French and Quebec jurisprudence and doctrine would have
guided us almost automatically to the proper application of the
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principle as a rule of law. Perhaps the scarcity of detailed English
language studies on the subject hampered us in this regard, but
Justice Challies' book is sufficiently detailed and complete to
serve as a practical guide, and where its text itself will not
suffice its ample citations will facilitate references to sources.
Robert A. Pascal*

CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT, by C. Herman Pritchett.
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1954. Pp. xi, 297.

$5.00.
When Fred Vinson became Chief Justice of the United
States in 1946, most of the constitutional issues relating to the
scope of federal power under the commerce and taxing clauses
and the war power had been resolved by decisions uniformly in
favor of national authority. The due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments had been deprived of vitality as
substantive limitations on legislative power in the sphere of
economic activity, and civil liberties had become the major area
of constitutional limitations and, except for the negative restraints of the commerce clause upon state power, the last outpost
of judicial review of legislative action. The developments leading
to this state of judicial affairs were treated by Mr. Pritchett in
1948 in a volume entitled The Roosevelt Court (New York, The
Macmillan Company, 1948), to which the instant volume is a
logical sequel, but unlike most sequels the continuation is even
better than its precursor.
Because of the circumscribed area of judicial review, aside
from an occasional decision like that of the Steel Seizure case
which involved executive action, Mr. Pritchett gives a fairly
complete account of the work of the Vinson Court even though
he confines his book to civil liberties. Although he depicts in
detail the individual differences of the Justices as revealed in
their printed opinions he omits the personal antagonisms which
rent the Court from 1946 to 1953, and wisely so because however
important such conflicts may have been in determining the course
of judicial decision data on them are far too meager to be
conclusive. Like The Roosevelt Court, Civil Liberties and the
Vinson Court is a study in judicial values. In executing this
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